Flavia Volpi, Cimbali Group, following the legal victory in China: “Intellectual property is, for us, a key asset, not a cost”
MILAN – The protection of intellectual property and design is playing an increasingly strategic role in the global professional coffee machine market. Cimbali Group’s recent victory in China in the case concerning the counterfeiting of Slayer Espresso ...
MILAN – The protection of intellectual property and design is playing an increasingly strategic role in the global professional coffee machine market. Cimbali Group’s recent victory in China in the case concerning the counterfeiting of Slayer Espresso machines marks a significant development in the protection of foreign trademarks and trade dress. The appeal ruling also recognized trademark infringement, increasing damages to RMB 2 million. Flavia Volpi, Group Legal & Corporate Affairs Director at Cimbali Group, speaks to Comunicaffè about the complex evidence-building process and the legal strategy developed across China, the United States and Italy.
Which evidence proved decisive in convincing the Chinese judges that the exterior appearance of the Slayer Espresso, in the combination of its distinctive aesthetic elements, was recognizable by the public as an indicator of the commercial origin of the product?
It required an imposing evidence-building effort, on two levels. On the level of distinctiveness, we demonstrated that the combination of the aesthetic elements of the Slayer Espresso — the X-shaped side legs, the bullet-shaped support feet, the three circular disk connection points between the legs and the body, the bell-shaped group head, the ear-shaped handles and the mirror element inclined at 45 degrees — produces a unitary and highly distinctive visual effect compared with ordinary professional machines.
Here I must give credit to our external counsel: one of the decisive factors was their remarkable ability to describe the machine in court — to translate design into legal language. Making a judge truly see the originality of a product is anything but trivial: it requires breaking the machine down into its individual features, explaining why each choice is aesthetic rather than functional, and then recomposing them into an overall image that the court can recognize as unique.
That is exactly what happened: the court excluded the individual functional elements taken in isolation, but protected the combination as a whole — the overall look of the machine. This was possible only because the in-house team invested time in making our lawyers understand the value and the peculiarities of the brand, so that they could express them at their best in the legal action.
On the level of reputation, the decisive evidence included proof of entry into the Chinese market as early as 2012, participation in the Hotelex Shanghai exhibition from 2013, coverage by Chinese press and online media from 2013-2014, large-scale sales through distributors from 2019, and the consistency of the product’s appearance over time.
Equally fundamental were the notarized purchases of the counterfeit products — including a visit by our agent directly to the production facility — and the in-court inspection, which established a design essentially identical to the original.
On appeal, trademark infringement was also recognized (which trademark?), reversing the first-instance decision on this point. What led to this result?
The trademark at issue is a composite mark consisting of the word “SLAYER” in artistic lettering in the upper part and the Chinese characters 司雷尔 (Si Lei Er) below.
The first-instance court had excluded any likelihood of confusion, emphasizing the graphic differences and the fact that the actual use of the mark did not perfectly coincide with its registered form.
The Court of Appeal overturned this approach on three points: it recognized that the use of the “SLAYER” logos on the machines, in commercial documents and in promotional materials constituted genuine use of the registered trademark, as it did not alter its distinctive character; it gave weight to the high reputation of the mark in the specialized field of professional coffee machines; and it held that the sign 斯莱尔 (Si Lai Er), although graphically different, was phonetically similar both to “SLAYER” and to 司雷尔, in a context of identical goods.
Finally, the proof of actual confusion was determinant: user comments on the defendants’ own social media accounts showed that the public was asking whether the products belonged to the American brand.
How complex was it to demonstrate the likelihood of confusion between original Slayer machines and imitation products among an audience of professional operators?
Very complex, because the opposing defence was insidious: the defendants claimed they had always declared the product to be “domestic”, thereby excluding any confusion as to origin.
The Court, however, upheld our argument: the relevant confusion concerns not only the origin of the product, but also the perception of a commercial connection with the rights holder.
And the decisive evidence came precisely from the counterfeiters’ own social channels: comments such as “Isn’t it an American brand?” or “You have authorization from Slayer, right?” documented real, not merely potential, confusion — precisely among professional operators.
This is a lesson I always share: the best evidence is often produced by the infringer itself.
The damages were increased on appeal from RMB 800,000 to RMB 2 million. Which factors influenced this quantification: the duration of the conduct, the scale of commercialization, the number of parties involved, the seriousness of the imitation, or other elements?
In the absence of proof of actual losses or of the infringers’ profits, the Court proceeded on an equitable basis, considering: the reputation of the trademark and of the trade dress; the evident bad faith — the defendants referred to “SLAYER” and to the “original version” in their own promotions, had filed several “SLAYER” trademark applications and even a design patent identical to our machine, subsequently declared entirely invalid; the systematic nature of the counterfeiting, with a genuine production line and repeated presence at industry trade fairs; and the seriousness of the consequences.
The recognition on appeal of the trademark infringement, which was added to the unfair competition, also carried weight, broadening the basis of the award: the Court found the entire amount we had claimed — RMB 2 million — to be reasonable, with joint and several liability of all defendants.
From a practical standpoint, what were the main difficulties encountered in obtaining protection of the product’s exterior appearance and distinctive signs before the Chinese courts?
First of all, the evidentiary rigour of the Chinese system: every piece of evidence must be notarized, from purchases at the factory to findings at trade fairs, and this requires planning, time and presence on the ground — I personally travelled to China during a trade fair to file an action at the fair’s IP desk.
Then there was the challenge of proving the reputation of the trade dress with evidence pre-dating the infringement, while also managing the admissibility of evidence formed abroad.
But the greatest complexity was structural: this case ran simultaneously across three jurisdictions — China, the United States and Italy — three legal systems and three business cultures.
As General Counsel, my role was to hold all of this together: aligning external counsel, internal teams scattered across time zones, and the business on a single strategy, down to the most practical burdens of legalizations and apostilles.
No external advisor, however capable, can coordinate that complexity alone: it takes someone who knows the company, its products and its people, and who can act as the connective tissue between jurisdictions.
Finally, we had to dismantle a genuine defensive arsenal: the trademark registrations and the design patent obtained by the counterfeiters themselves — which we had invalidated in administrative proceedings — and arguments such as the alleged lapse of the design into the public domain after fifteen years, which the Court rejected, clarifying that unfair-competition protection of trade dress is not subject to the time limits of patent law.
In your view, does this decision signal an evolution in the approach of Chinese courts to the protection of foreign brands and, in particular, of products whose competitive value also lies in design and aesthetic recognizability?
I believe so, and in several directions. The judgment confirms that the overall exterior appearance of a product can be protected as trade dress under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, even many years after its launch; it recognizes infringement based on phonetic similarity between transliterations, an extremely delicate point for Western brands in China; and it demonstrates the willingness of the courts to sanction bad faith severely, more than doubling the damages.
For companies whose competitive value lies in design and aesthetic recognizability, this is an important signal: the Chinese system today offers effective tools, provided one invests in a rigorous evidentiary strategy.
In a complex environment such as China, many foreign companies prefer to close counterfeiting disputes quickly, through settlements or compromise solutions. You chose a different path, taking the case all the way to appeal. Which legal, commercial and strategic considerations guided this choice?
Several law firms had told us our chances of winning were slim, and some consultants had even suggested waiting, convinced that the phenomenon would deflate on its own. The opposite happened: the counterfeiting gained momentum.
At that point the assessment was legal, commercial and strategic at once: China is the second-largest market for the Slayer brand, the very aggressiveness of the counterfeiters confirmed the value of the mark, and a settlement would have left a dangerous precedent on the market.
Coordinating the case across three jurisdictions as General Counsel, with my colleague Beatrice Ricci, both of us drawing on our litigation backgrounds, we were able to build internally the evidence and the strategies that proved decisive.
Our shareholders believed in our strategy, because at Cimbali Group intellectual property is regarded as a core asset, not a cost. And time proved us right.
Beyond the symbolic and reputational value of the decision, what concrete effects can this victory have on Cimbali Group’s commercial position in China?
China now counts more than 87,000 coffee shops, growing at 31.5%: it is a rapidly expanding market for premium machines.
The immediate cessation order clears the channel of imitation products which, sold at significantly lower prices, generated confusion in the professional supply chain and eroded the brand’s premium positioning.
The judgment strengthens the confidence of distributors and customers, has an evident deterrent effect on future infringers, and increases the economic value of the IP and therefore of the company itself.
But as I always say: the legal victory is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. It must be accompanied by marketing and communication actions — including on Chinese local social channels, where we have invested through a dedicated agency — because, in the end, the strongest defence of a brand is a market that wants the original.
Flavia Volpi, Cimbali Group, following the legal victory in China: “Intellectual property is, for us, a key asset, not a cost”
MILAN – The protection of intellectual property and design is playing an increasingly strategic role in the global professional coffee machine market. Cimbali Group’s recent victory in China in the case concerning the counterfeiting of Slayer Espresso ...
MILAN – The protection of intellectual property and design is playing an increasingly strategic role in the global professional coffee machine market. Cimbali Group’s recent victory in China in the case concerning the counterfeiting of Slayer Espresso machines marks a significant development in the protection of foreign trademarks and trade dress. The appeal ruling also recognized trademark infringement, increasing damages to RMB 2 million. Flavia Volpi, Group Legal & Corporate Affairs Director at Cimbali Group, speaks to Comunicaffè about the complex evidence-building process and the legal strategy developed across China, the United States and Italy.
Which evidence proved decisive in convincing the Chinese judges that the exterior appearance of the Slayer Espresso, in the combination of its distinctive aesthetic elements, was recognizable by the public as an indicator of the commercial origin of the product?
It required an imposing evidence-building effort, on two levels. On the level of distinctiveness, we demonstrated that the combination of the aesthetic elements of the Slayer Espresso — the X-shaped side legs, the bullet-shaped support feet, the three circular disk connection points between the legs and the body, the bell-shaped group head, the ear-shaped handles and the mirror element inclined at 45 degrees — produces a unitary and highly distinctive visual effect compared with ordinary professional machines.
Here I must give credit to our external counsel: one of the decisive factors was their remarkable ability to describe the machine in court — to translate design into legal language. Making a judge truly see the originality of a product is anything but trivial: it requires breaking the machine down into its individual features, explaining why each choice is aesthetic rather than functional, and then recomposing them into an overall image that the court can recognize as unique.
That is exactly what happened: the court excluded the individual functional elements taken in isolation, but protected the combination as a whole — the overall look of the machine. This was possible only because the in-house team invested time in making our lawyers understand the value and the peculiarities of the brand, so that they could express them at their best in the legal action.
On the level of reputation, the decisive evidence included proof of entry into the Chinese market as early as 2012, participation in the Hotelex Shanghai exhibition from 2013, coverage by Chinese press and online media from 2013-2014, large-scale sales through distributors from 2019, and the consistency of the product’s appearance over time.
Equally fundamental were the notarized purchases of the counterfeit products — including a visit by our agent directly to the production facility — and the in-court inspection, which established a design essentially identical to the original.
On appeal, trademark infringement was also recognized (which trademark?), reversing the first-instance decision on this point. What led to this result?
The trademark at issue is a composite mark consisting of the word “SLAYER” in artistic lettering in the upper part and the Chinese characters 司雷尔 (Si Lei Er) below.
The first-instance court had excluded any likelihood of confusion, emphasizing the graphic differences and the fact that the actual use of the mark did not perfectly coincide with its registered form.
The Court of Appeal overturned this approach on three points: it recognized that the use of the “SLAYER” logos on the machines, in commercial documents and in promotional materials constituted genuine use of the registered trademark, as it did not alter its distinctive character; it gave weight to the high reputation of the mark in the specialized field of professional coffee machines; and it held that the sign 斯莱尔 (Si Lai Er), although graphically different, was phonetically similar both to “SLAYER” and to 司雷尔, in a context of identical goods.
Finally, the proof of actual confusion was determinant: user comments on the defendants’ own social media accounts showed that the public was asking whether the products belonged to the American brand.
How complex was it to demonstrate the likelihood of confusion between original Slayer machines and imitation products among an audience of professional operators?
Very complex, because the opposing defence was insidious: the defendants claimed they had always declared the product to be “domestic”, thereby excluding any confusion as to origin.
The Court, however, upheld our argument: the relevant confusion concerns not only the origin of the product, but also the perception of a commercial connection with the rights holder.
And the decisive evidence came precisely from the counterfeiters’ own social channels: comments such as “Isn’t it an American brand?” or “You have authorization from Slayer, right?” documented real, not merely potential, confusion — precisely among professional operators.
This is a lesson I always share: the best evidence is often produced by the infringer itself.
The damages were increased on appeal from RMB 800,000 to RMB 2 million. Which factors influenced this quantification: the duration of the conduct, the scale of commercialization, the number of parties involved, the seriousness of the imitation, or other elements?
In the absence of proof of actual losses or of the infringers’ profits, the Court proceeded on an equitable basis, considering: the reputation of the trademark and of the trade dress; the evident bad faith — the defendants referred to “SLAYER” and to the “original version” in their own promotions, had filed several “SLAYER” trademark applications and even a design patent identical to our machine, subsequently declared entirely invalid; the systematic nature of the counterfeiting, with a genuine production line and repeated presence at industry trade fairs; and the seriousness of the consequences.
The recognition on appeal of the trademark infringement, which was added to the unfair competition, also carried weight, broadening the basis of the award: the Court found the entire amount we had claimed — RMB 2 million — to be reasonable, with joint and several liability of all defendants.
From a practical standpoint, what were the main difficulties encountered in obtaining protection of the product’s exterior appearance and distinctive signs before the Chinese courts?
First of all, the evidentiary rigour of the Chinese system: every piece of evidence must be notarized, from purchases at the factory to findings at trade fairs, and this requires planning, time and presence on the ground — I personally travelled to China during a trade fair to file an action at the fair’s IP desk.
Then there was the challenge of proving the reputation of the trade dress with evidence pre-dating the infringement, while also managing the admissibility of evidence formed abroad.
But the greatest complexity was structural: this case ran simultaneously across three jurisdictions — China, the United States and Italy — three legal systems and three business cultures.
As General Counsel, my role was to hold all of this together: aligning external counsel, internal teams scattered across time zones, and the business on a single strategy, down to the most practical burdens of legalizations and apostilles.
No external advisor, however capable, can coordinate that complexity alone: it takes someone who knows the company, its products and its people, and who can act as the connective tissue between jurisdictions.
Finally, we had to dismantle a genuine defensive arsenal: the trademark registrations and the design patent obtained by the counterfeiters themselves — which we had invalidated in administrative proceedings — and arguments such as the alleged lapse of the design into the public domain after fifteen years, which the Court rejected, clarifying that unfair-competition protection of trade dress is not subject to the time limits of patent law.
In your view, does this decision signal an evolution in the approach of Chinese courts to the protection of foreign brands and, in particular, of products whose competitive value also lies in design and aesthetic recognizability?
I believe so, and in several directions. The judgment confirms that the overall exterior appearance of a product can be protected as trade dress under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, even many years after its launch; it recognizes infringement based on phonetic similarity between transliterations, an extremely delicate point for Western brands in China; and it demonstrates the willingness of the courts to sanction bad faith severely, more than doubling the damages.
For companies whose competitive value lies in design and aesthetic recognizability, this is an important signal: the Chinese system today offers effective tools, provided one invests in a rigorous evidentiary strategy.
In a complex environment such as China, many foreign companies prefer to close counterfeiting disputes quickly, through settlements or compromise solutions. You chose a different path, taking the case all the way to appeal. Which legal, commercial and strategic considerations guided this choice?
Several law firms had told us our chances of winning were slim, and some consultants had even suggested waiting, convinced that the phenomenon would deflate on its own. The opposite happened: the counterfeiting gained momentum.
At that point the assessment was legal, commercial and strategic at once: China is the second-largest market for the Slayer brand, the very aggressiveness of the counterfeiters confirmed the value of the mark, and a settlement would have left a dangerous precedent on the market.
Coordinating the case across three jurisdictions as General Counsel, with my colleague Beatrice Ricci, both of us drawing on our litigation backgrounds, we were able to build internally the evidence and the strategies that proved decisive.
Our shareholders believed in our strategy, because at Cimbali Group intellectual property is regarded as a core asset, not a cost. And time proved us right.
Beyond the symbolic and reputational value of the decision, what concrete effects can this victory have on Cimbali Group’s commercial position in China?
China now counts more than 87,000 coffee shops, growing at 31.5%: it is a rapidly expanding market for premium machines.
The immediate cessation order clears the channel of imitation products which, sold at significantly lower prices, generated confusion in the professional supply chain and eroded the brand’s premium positioning.
The judgment strengthens the confidence of distributors and customers, has an evident deterrent effect on future infringers, and increases the economic value of the IP and therefore of the company itself.
But as I always say: the legal victory is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. It must be accompanied by marketing and communication actions — including on Chinese local social channels, where we have invested through a dedicated agency — because, in the end, the strongest defence of a brand is a market that wants the original.
Flavia Volpi, Cimbali Group, following the legal victory in China: “Intellectual property is, for us, a key asset, not a cost”
MILAN – The protection of intellectual property and design is playing an increasingly strategic role in the global professional coffee machine market. Cimbali Group’s recent victory in China in the case concerning the counterfeiting of Slayer Espresso ...
MILAN – The protection of intellectual property and design is playing an increasingly strategic role in the global professional coffee machine market. Cimbali Group’s recent victory in China in the case concerning the counterfeiting of Slayer Espresso machines marks a significant development in the protection of foreign trademarks and trade dress. The appeal ruling also recognized trademark infringement, increasing damages to RMB 2 million. Flavia Volpi, Group Legal & Corporate Affairs Director at Cimbali Group, speaks to Comunicaffè about the complex evidence-building process and the legal strategy developed across China, the United States and Italy.
Which evidence proved decisive in convincing the Chinese judges that the exterior appearance of the Slayer Espresso, in the combination of its distinctive aesthetic elements, was recognizable by the public as an indicator of the commercial origin of the product?
It required an imposing evidence-building effort, on two levels. On the level of distinctiveness, we demonstrated that the combination of the aesthetic elements of the Slayer Espresso — the X-shaped side legs, the bullet-shaped support feet, the three circular disk connection points between the legs and the body, the bell-shaped group head, the ear-shaped handles and the mirror element inclined at 45 degrees — produces a unitary and highly distinctive visual effect compared with ordinary professional machines.
Here I must give credit to our external counsel: one of the decisive factors was their remarkable ability to describe the machine in court — to translate design into legal language. Making a judge truly see the originality of a product is anything but trivial: it requires breaking the machine down into its individual features, explaining why each choice is aesthetic rather than functional, and then recomposing them into an overall image that the court can recognize as unique.
That is exactly what happened: the court excluded the individual functional elements taken in isolation, but protected the combination as a whole — the overall look of the machine. This was possible only because the in-house team invested time in making our lawyers understand the value and the peculiarities of the brand, so that they could express them at their best in the legal action.
On the level of reputation, the decisive evidence included proof of entry into the Chinese market as early as 2012, participation in the Hotelex Shanghai exhibition from 2013, coverage by Chinese press and online media from 2013-2014, large-scale sales through distributors from 2019, and the consistency of the product’s appearance over time.
Equally fundamental were the notarized purchases of the counterfeit products — including a visit by our agent directly to the production facility — and the in-court inspection, which established a design essentially identical to the original.
On appeal, trademark infringement was also recognized (which trademark?), reversing the first-instance decision on this point. What led to this result?
The trademark at issue is a composite mark consisting of the word “SLAYER” in artistic lettering in the upper part and the Chinese characters 司雷尔 (Si Lei Er) below.
The first-instance court had excluded any likelihood of confusion, emphasizing the graphic differences and the fact that the actual use of the mark did not perfectly coincide with its registered form.
The Court of Appeal overturned this approach on three points: it recognized that the use of the “SLAYER” logos on the machines, in commercial documents and in promotional materials constituted genuine use of the registered trademark, as it did not alter its distinctive character; it gave weight to the high reputation of the mark in the specialized field of professional coffee machines; and it held that the sign 斯莱尔 (Si Lai Er), although graphically different, was phonetically similar both to “SLAYER” and to 司雷尔, in a context of identical goods.
Finally, the proof of actual confusion was determinant: user comments on the defendants’ own social media accounts showed that the public was asking whether the products belonged to the American brand.
How complex was it to demonstrate the likelihood of confusion between original Slayer machines and imitation products among an audience of professional operators?
Very complex, because the opposing defence was insidious: the defendants claimed they had always declared the product to be “domestic”, thereby excluding any confusion as to origin.
The Court, however, upheld our argument: the relevant confusion concerns not only the origin of the product, but also the perception of a commercial connection with the rights holder.
And the decisive evidence came precisely from the counterfeiters’ own social channels: comments such as “Isn’t it an American brand?” or “You have authorization from Slayer, right?” documented real, not merely potential, confusion — precisely among professional operators.
This is a lesson I always share: the best evidence is often produced by the infringer itself.
The damages were increased on appeal from RMB 800,000 to RMB 2 million. Which factors influenced this quantification: the duration of the conduct, the scale of commercialization, the number of parties involved, the seriousness of the imitation, or other elements?
In the absence of proof of actual losses or of the infringers’ profits, the Court proceeded on an equitable basis, considering: the reputation of the trademark and of the trade dress; the evident bad faith — the defendants referred to “SLAYER” and to the “original version” in their own promotions, had filed several “SLAYER” trademark applications and even a design patent identical to our machine, subsequently declared entirely invalid; the systematic nature of the counterfeiting, with a genuine production line and repeated presence at industry trade fairs; and the seriousness of the consequences.
The recognition on appeal of the trademark infringement, which was added to the unfair competition, also carried weight, broadening the basis of the award: the Court found the entire amount we had claimed — RMB 2 million — to be reasonable, with joint and several liability of all defendants.
From a practical standpoint, what were the main difficulties encountered in obtaining protection of the product’s exterior appearance and distinctive signs before the Chinese courts?
First of all, the evidentiary rigour of the Chinese system: every piece of evidence must be notarized, from purchases at the factory to findings at trade fairs, and this requires planning, time and presence on the ground — I personally travelled to China during a trade fair to file an action at the fair’s IP desk.
Then there was the challenge of proving the reputation of the trade dress with evidence pre-dating the infringement, while also managing the admissibility of evidence formed abroad.
But the greatest complexity was structural: this case ran simultaneously across three jurisdictions — China, the United States and Italy — three legal systems and three business cultures.
As General Counsel, my role was to hold all of this together: aligning external counsel, internal teams scattered across time zones, and the business on a single strategy, down to the most practical burdens of legalizations and apostilles.
No external advisor, however capable, can coordinate that complexity alone: it takes someone who knows the company, its products and its people, and who can act as the connective tissue between jurisdictions.
Finally, we had to dismantle a genuine defensive arsenal: the trademark registrations and the design patent obtained by the counterfeiters themselves — which we had invalidated in administrative proceedings — and arguments such as the alleged lapse of the design into the public domain after fifteen years, which the Court rejected, clarifying that unfair-competition protection of trade dress is not subject to the time limits of patent law.
In your view, does this decision signal an evolution in the approach of Chinese courts to the protection of foreign brands and, in particular, of products whose competitive value also lies in design and aesthetic recognizability?
I believe so, and in several directions. The judgment confirms that the overall exterior appearance of a product can be protected as trade dress under the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, even many years after its launch; it recognizes infringement based on phonetic similarity between transliterations, an extremely delicate point for Western brands in China; and it demonstrates the willingness of the courts to sanction bad faith severely, more than doubling the damages.
For companies whose competitive value lies in design and aesthetic recognizability, this is an important signal: the Chinese system today offers effective tools, provided one invests in a rigorous evidentiary strategy.
In a complex environment such as China, many foreign companies prefer to close counterfeiting disputes quickly, through settlements or compromise solutions. You chose a different path, taking the case all the way to appeal. Which legal, commercial and strategic considerations guided this choice?
Several law firms had told us our chances of winning were slim, and some consultants had even suggested waiting, convinced that the phenomenon would deflate on its own. The opposite happened: the counterfeiting gained momentum.
At that point the assessment was legal, commercial and strategic at once: China is the second-largest market for the Slayer brand, the very aggressiveness of the counterfeiters confirmed the value of the mark, and a settlement would have left a dangerous precedent on the market.
Coordinating the case across three jurisdictions as General Counsel, with my colleague Beatrice Ricci, both of us drawing on our litigation backgrounds, we were able to build internally the evidence and the strategies that proved decisive.
Our shareholders believed in our strategy, because at Cimbali Group intellectual property is regarded as a core asset, not a cost. And time proved us right.
Beyond the symbolic and reputational value of the decision, what concrete effects can this victory have on Cimbali Group’s commercial position in China?
China now counts more than 87,000 coffee shops, growing at 31.5%: it is a rapidly expanding market for premium machines.
The immediate cessation order clears the channel of imitation products which, sold at significantly lower prices, generated confusion in the professional supply chain and eroded the brand’s premium positioning.
The judgment strengthens the confidence of distributors and customers, has an evident deterrent effect on future infringers, and increases the economic value of the IP and therefore of the company itself.
But as I always say: the legal victory is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. It must be accompanied by marketing and communication actions — including on Chinese local social channels, where we have invested through a dedicated agency — because, in the end, the strongest defence of a brand is a market that wants the original.
